CNN:Could Germany save eurozone by leaving it?
(...)
The single most essential element of a euro rescue has always been one form or another of a euro bond guaranteed jointly by all eurozone member countries. What the U.S. Treasury bond is to the U.S. economy, the euro bond would be to the EU. The main obstacle has been Germany's insistence that it would not guarantee payments on bonds for the benefit of other European countries.
German reversion to the deutsche mark would remove this obstacle, and with no further German opposition, the remainder of the eurozone could move ahead to establish a true euro bond, along with a unified treasury function to match the unified banking function of the European Central Bank.
The single most essential element of a euro rescue has always been one form or another of a euro bond guaranteed jointly by all eurozone member countries. What the U.S. Treasury bond is to the U.S. economy, the euro bond would be to the EU. The main obstacle has been Germany's insistence that it would not guarantee payments on bonds for the benefit of other European countries.
German reversion to the deutsche mark would remove this obstacle, and with no further German opposition, the remainder of the eurozone could move ahead to establish a true euro bond, along with a unified treasury function to match the unified banking function of the European Central Bank.
(...)
CNN:
Μπορεί η Γερμανία να σώσει την ευρωζώνη
εγκαταλείποντάς την;
Οι αδυναμίες της ευρωπαϊκής περιφέρειας δεν είναι το
πρόβλημα
Καθώς η Ελλάδα κινδυνεύει με έξοδο από το ευρώ και η ευρωπαϊκή και
παγκόσμια οικονομία με αποσταθεροποίηση, η Γερμανία ίσως πρέπει να εξετάσει το
ενδεχόμενο να εγκαταλείψει η ίδια την ευρωζώνη προκειμένου να τη σώσει, εκτιμά
το αμερικανικό ειδησεογραφικό δίκτυο CNN.
«Υπάρχει ένας τρόπος οι ευρωπαίοι να αντιστρέψουν αυτή την καταστροφική
δυναμική με μία απλή αντισυμβατική λύση: Αντί να σπρώχνουν την Ελλάδα εκτός
ευρωζώνης, η Γερμανία εθελοντικά θα πρέπει να αποσυρθεί και να επανεκδώσει το
πολυαγαπημένο της μάρκο» αναφέρεται στο δημοσίευμα. Το πρόβλημα, σύμφωνα με
τους αρθρογράφους του CNN, δεν είναι οι αδυναμίες της ευρωπαϊκής περιφέρειας,
δηλαδή της Ελλάδας, της Ιταλίας, της Ισπανίας, της Πορτογαλίας και της
Ιρλανδίας, αλλά η υπερβολική ανταγωνιστικότητα της Γερμανίας.
«Η αξία του ευρώ αντανακλά τον μέσο όρο της συνδυασμένης
ανταγωνιστικότητας των χωρών της ευρωζώνης. Αλλά η ανταγωνιστικότητα της
Γερμανίας είναι πολύ πάνω από τον μέσο όρο. Έτσι, για τη Γερμανία το ευρώ είναι
πολύ αδύναμο. Γι' αυτό τον λόγο η Γερμανία συσσωρεύει χρόνιο εμπορικό πλεόνασμα
στην κλίμακα της Κίνας», προστίθεται.
Επομένως, εξηγεί το δημοσίευμα, «για όσο διάστημα οι χώρες της ευρωζώνης
είναι καθηλωμένες στο ευρώ με τη Γερμανία, ο μόνος τρόπος να γίνουν και οι ίδιες
ανταγωνιστικές είναι να γίνουν πιο "γερμανικές", μέσω μέτρων λιτότητας και
περιορισμό των κρατικών δαπανών, μείωση του προϋπολογισμού για την πρόνοια,
μείωση μισθών και αύξηση της ανεργίας. Φυσικά, αυτό είναι που κάνουν τα
τελευταία δύο χρόνια. Στόχος είναι να επιτευχθεί ανάπτυξη μέσω των εξαγωγών.
Όμως καθώς η Γερμανία είναι υπερβολικά ανταγωνιστική και δεν διατίθεται να
τονώσει την οικονομία της για να επιτύχει μεγαλύτερη κατανάλωση, οι ευρωπαίοι
εταίροι της δεν μπορούν να αυξήσουν τις εξαγωγές τους και να γίνουν περισσότερο
ανταγωνιστικοί».
Φυσικά το κόστος που θα επωμισθεί η Γερμανία, αν αποφασίσει να φύγει από το
ευρώ, σώζοντας με αυτό τον τρόπο την Ευρώπη, δεν θα είναι μηδενικό: «Θα πληγούν
οι εξαγωγές και ίσως υπάρξει μία προσωρινή αύξηση της ανεργίας, αλλά η επιστροφή
στο γερμανικό μάρκο θα προσελκύσει μία ροή κεφαλαίων στη Γερμανία και επομένως
θα προωθήσει τις επενδύσεις ενώ θα κρατάει τα επιτόκια και τον πληθωρισμό σε
χαμηλά επίπεδα» αναφέρουν οι αρθρογράφοι και καταλήγουν: «Το πραγματικό ερώτημα
είναι αν το κόστος της μικρότερης ανάπτυξης εξαγωγών και της μεγαλύτερης
ανεργίας είναι μικρότερο από το να πληρώνει την Ελλάδα, μετά την Ισπανία, κ.ο.κ.
Με κάποιον τρόπο ο "άγνωστος" κίνδυνος της εξόδου της Γερμανίας από το ευρώ
δείχνει περισσότερο διαχειρίσιμος, περισσότερο μετρήσιμος και πιο οικείος από
την ατελείωτη λιτότητα, την κοινωνική αναταραχή και την πολιτική πόλωση».
ΤΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΕΤΑΙ ΣΤΟ
''ΒΗΜΑ''
31-5-2012
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ
Could Germany save eurozone by leaving it?
30-5-2012
The analysis of the problems of
the euro and the European Union has long been upside down, focused on the debt
and competitive weaknesses of the so-called peripheral countries (Greece, Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Ireland) and especially of Greece. But issues of debt and
competitiveness existed and were dealt with rather easily long before the euro
arrived, through periodic devaluation of the currencies of the less-competitive
countries against those of the more competitive countries, and especially
against the deutsche mark.
The problem now is not the
weaknesses of the periphery, it's the excessive competitive strength of Germany.
Not only is the German economy inherently strong as a result of the high
productivity of its workforce, its exports have added competitiveness because
the euro is undervalued as far as Germany is concerned. Because it is the common
currency of the eurozone countries, the value of the euro reflects the average
of their combined competitiveness. But Germany's competitiveness is far above
the average. So, for Germany, the euro is too weak. This is why Germany has been
accumulating chronic trade surpluses on the scale of the Chinese.
As long as the rest of the
eurozone countries are locked in the euro with Germany, the only way for them to
become more competitive is to become, well, more Germanic, through austerity
measures that cut government spending, reduce welfare budgets, cut wages and
raise unemployment. This is, of course, what they have been doing for the past
two years.
The aim has been to achieve
export-led growth. But because Germany is so hypercompetitive and has been
unwilling to stimulate its own economy to achieve higher consumption, its
eurozone partners have not been able to increase exports to it and have had thus
to compete with it in exporting to the likes of China and the United States.
That hasn't been working very
well, and now the consequences of grinding austerity are beginning to tear the
political and social fabric even of countries like the Netherlands, which until
quite recently were enthusiastically echoing the German call for austerity and
growth led by trade with countries outside the EU.
But it is not clear that the
eurozone can sustain the social and political pain of austerity long enough and
on the scale necessary to eventually achieve competitive parity with
Germany.
The alternative is for Germany to
revert to the deutsche mark. That would immediately result in appreciation of
the German currency and competitive devaluation of the euro for the remaining
eurozone countries. Germany would tend to buy more while selling less, and vice
versa for the rest of the eurozone. The extra consumption that Germany will not
deliver via stimulus policies would be automatically delivered by currency
revaluation.
The single most essential element
of a euro rescue has always been one form or another of a euro bond guaranteed
jointly by all eurozone member countries. What the U.S. Treasury bond is to the
U.S. economy, the euro bond would be to the EU. The main obstacle has been
Germany's insistence that it would not guarantee payments on bonds for the
benefit of other European countries.
German reversion to the deutsche
mark would remove this obstacle, and with no further German opposition, the
remainder of the eurozone could move ahead to establish a true euro bond, along
with a unified treasury function to match the unified banking function of the
European Central Bank.
Some may object that German
backing would still be required for the eurozone and a euro bond to be viable.
That is correct, and Germany would indeed remain committed to the eurozone for a
number of reasons. It would need the eurozone more than ever to buy its
increasingly expensive exports. The Bundesbank (Germany's central bank) would
undoubtedly sell deutsche marks against euros to mitigate appreciation, and the
resulting accumulation of euros would be invested in the new euro bonds. This in
turn might inspire the European Central Bank to initiate quantitative easing
programs that would stimulate the entire EU economy.
The cost to Germany of saving
Europe will be a hit to exports and perhaps a temporary rise in unemployment,
but a return to the deutsche mark would attract a flood of capital to Germany
and thereby spur investment while holding interest rates and inflation down.
The real question is whether the
cost of slower export growth and increased unemployment is less than that of
paying for Greece, then Spain, etc. Somehow, the "unknown" risks of a German
exit from the euro appear more manageable, more quantifiable and in some ways
more familiar a challenge than endless austerity, social unrest and political
polarization.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely
those of Clyde Prestowitz and John Prout.
(Editor's note:
Clyde Prestowitz writes on globalization for ForeignPolicy.com and is president of the Economic Strategy Institute.
John Prout is the former Paris-based treasurer of Credit Commercial de France.)
ΤΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΕΤΑΙ ΣΤHN ΙΣΤΟΣΕΛΙΔΑ